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Abstract
Over the past decade, the theories of Diffusion of Innovations and of Economics of Standards have
been integrated to explain the Diffusion of Standards in Information Technologies. More recently,
complex networked technologies unique to particular industries have been identified as a separate
category called vertical standards, and the study of their adoption within and across industries has
begun. This paper adds to the discourse by developing a theory-based model to explain variance in the
adoption of vertical standards by firms. We posit that vertical standards adoption will be influenced by
firm-level factors and adopter community-level factors. Key firm-level factors such as prior
technology drag, knowledge barriers, and expected benefits, and adopter community-level factors
such as standard legitimization and orphaning risk are identified as antecedents of vertical standards
adoption. We also identify factors that impact each of these antecedents and put forth a research
model interrelating these factors to vertical standards adoption. We expect to test our research model
using data collected through a web-based survey of OASIS member firms.
Keywords: technology adoption, vertical standards.

1

INTRODUCTION

Recent technology adoption research has begun to recognize the existence of two distinct classes of
standards: horizontal and vertical. While horizontal standards formally describe IT products that apply
across multiple industries, vertical standards specifically address data structures, formats, and business
processes particular to narrow industries (Markus et al. 2003). Vertical standards hold the promise of
cross-platform systems integration, consistent product and service descriptor semantics, and the
formalization and codification of best practices in any given industry. Their adoption is recognized to
be a complicated interplay of market signals and individual evaluation by organizations, shaped by
characteristics inherent to vertical standards as technology artifacts, as well as by community adoption
behavior exogenous to the standards. This paper contributes to the emerging literature on IT vertical
standards adoption by empirically testing a two-level model of organizational adoption. The model
combines firm- and community-level adoption factors drawn from Diffusion of Innovations (DoI)
theory and Economic Benefits of Standards (EoS) research.

2

DIFFUSION OF STANDARDS

Firm-level technology adoption has been studied using various combinations of, and extensions to, the
five characteristics of innovations (complexity, trialability, compatibility, observability, and relative
advantage) originally described by Rogers (1983). While technology complexity increases learning
demands on a firm, the degree to which it may be experimented with (trialability) contributes to their
reduction. Compatibility protects the firm’s investment in existing technology, and the ability to
extract observable benefits may lead to relative advantage for the organization. These adoption
decision variables are best evaluated at the level of the individual firm, but are influenced dramatically
by the effects of behaviors in communities of potential adopters. Behaviors such as the nature of
standards development processes, ‘herd’ adoption, and network externalities leading to critical mass
determine the level of legitimacy of technology artifacts and complex technology adoption risks.
Over the past decade, a new stream of technology adoption research that combines organizational
adoption concepts with community adoption ideas has materialized. This emerging body of work has
been labeled Diffusion of Standards (DoS), and draws from DoI theory and from the extensive
literature on EoS. Since its introduction, DoI theory has been adapted to the study of technology
innovations, and extended beyond its original paradigm of individuals making voluntary, binary
adoption decisions to include organizational (Thong 1999), mandated (Hart & Saunders 1997), and
complex networked technology adoption (Lyytinen & Damsgaard 2001, Hovav et al. 2004). The
benefits of standards, defined as specifications for product, system, or application compatibility
implemented by technology producers and consumers (David & Greenstein 1990, Farrell & Saloner
1992), have been studied extensively using economic theory concepts such as network effects,
switching costs, lock-in, and orphaning risk (Shapiro & Varian 1999a, b). The economic models used
to complete the majority of EoS research do not adequately reflect real-world variables such as
standards sensitive to environmental changes (Damsgaard & Truex 2000), or the role of users,
standards developing organizations (SDOs), consortia, and other intermediating institutions during
technical development (Kotinurmi et al. 2003, Damsgaard & Lyytinen 2001). DoS theory incorporates
variables not used in research based exclusively either on DoI or EoS, allowing for the study of firmlevel adoption decisions influenced and shaped by factors specific to a community of potential
adopters.

3

ORGANIZATIONAL ADOPTION OF VERTICAL STANDARDS

Current research acknowledges the role of various properties of standards in their adoption. The
difference between physical or information-based products (Kotinurmi et al. 2003), timing of
introduction (Baskin et al. 1998), complexity and wholeness (Libicki et al. 2000), and source of their
authority (David & Greenstein 1990, Farrell & Saloner 1992) have all been suggested as potential
shapers of standards adoption. Additionally, and of primary interest to this effort, standards have been
identified as being either horizontal or vertical, based on the specificity of their domain (Markus et al.
2003). Horizontal standards describe basic levels of connectivity and are applicable across various
industries. For example, EDI describes simple document formats that are reusable across several
industries, and the base XML recommendation is broad enough to fit any domain. By contrast, vertical
standards focus on data and business processes by developing common vocabularies, metadata, and
processes that can be customized to the needs of very specific niches, and are designed to promote
greater process and systems integration within a particular industry. Differences between the adoption
behaviors of horizontal and vertical standards have been suggested in the literature (Jain & Zhao
2003), and while empirical models of adoption for horizontal standards abound, the model described
here is the first one we are aware of for vertical standards.

Figure 1.

Factors impacting the adoption of vertical standards.

This paper uses a DoS theoretical lens to develop an organizational model of adoption of vertical
standards (Figure 1). Since DoS theory is a combination of well-known effects found in DoI theory
and in the literature on economic benefits of standards the model incorporates, implicitly and

explicitly, the major constructs found in both theories. DoI innovation characteristics such as
compatibility and complexity are combined with economic effects such as network externalities and
lock-in to generate a model that combines firm-level and community- adoption variables. Firm-level
adoption is explored via DoI variables such as Technology Drag, which reflects compatibility
concerns of new technology. Knowledge Barriers captures the tension between increased learning
demands due to complexity and their reduction through trialability. In addition, observable benefits of
compatibility with business processes and data structures, which may lead to relative advantage for the
firm, are considered under the Benefits factor. Salient variables at the level of the community of
adopters, such as network externalities and lock-in, are included in our treatment of Orphaning Risk
and Standards Legitimation. The model will be tested empirically using data obtained from the
membership of OASIS, an organization focused on the development, convergence, and adoption of
electronic business standards.

3.1

Technology Drag

Technology drag arises when investment on an installed base of legacy technology prevents the
adoption of newer solutions (Fichman & Kemerer 1993). Technology development and installation,
support skills acquisition, and end-user training increase investment value. Potential disruptions to
process integration between partners also contribute to technology drag (Holland & Lockett 1997). It
is suggested here that extensive investment in legacy technologies increases technology drag, which in
turn reduces the likelihood of adoption of vertical standards. However, legacy technologies provide
organizations with a number of operational and strategic benefits proven to shape their adoption
(Arunachalam 1995, Iacovou et al. 1995), and it is proposed here these benefits also contribute to an
increase in technology drag. Lastly, organizations with extensive investment in proprietary
applications seek to maximize their benefits which leads to an increase in technology drag when
replacement technologies to support vertical standards are considered. In summary, the following
hypotheses are offered:
• Hypothesis 1 – High levels of technology drag are associated with a lowered likelihood of
adoption of vertical standards by an organization.
• Hypothesis 1a – High levels of legacy technology investment increase technology drag.
• Hypothesis 1b – High levels of legacy technology benefits increase technology drag.
• Hypothesis 1c – High levels of proprietary application investment increase technology drag.

3.2

Knowledge Barriers

Knowledge barriers are low levels of expertise with new technology evaluation, its applications, and
required management and support processes, and are associated with lowered likelihood of complex
technology adoption (Attewell 1992). In addition to its effect on technology drag, proprietary
application investment is hypothesized to reduce knowledge barriers by helping the organization
acquire the application, procedural, and evaluative expertise (Ravichandran) described above. Also,
DoS research explicitly recognizes the role of users in the development of standards (Dedrick & West
2003, Nickerson & Muehlen 2003, Kotinurmi et al. 2003). We offer that firm participation in vertical
standards development activities reduces knowledge barriers because it increases IT skills
sophistication and familiarity with system development and integration activities required by the
standard, as it progresses through development. In summary, we posit that
• Hypothesis 2 – High knowledge barriers are associated with a lowered likelihood of adoption of
vertical standards by an organization.

• Hypothesis 2a – High levels of proprietary application investment lower organizational knowledge
barriers.
• Hypothesis 2b – Participation in the development of industry vertical standards reduces
organizational knowledge barriers.

3.3

Benefits

Despite extensive research efforts, a single theory explaining how, or if, IT provides competitive
advantage across industries has not yet emerged. Existing literature suggests that complementary and
co-specialized assets (Dedrick & West 2003, Subramani 2004), systems integration, and business
reengineering (Swatman et al. 1994) are critical to the firm’s ability to extract maximum benefits from
IT. We hypothesize that the primary benefits of vertical standards are systems integration and business
process reengineering enabled by their adoption. Systems integration is enabled by the formalization
and codification of industry-specific data formats in vertical standards. For the same reason, firms may
maximize the benefits of business process reengineering because they can more closely match the
processes formalized and codified in any adopted standards. In short, the following is proposed
• Hypothesis 3 – High levels of business benefits are associated with a higher likelihood of adoption
of vertical standards by an organization.
• Hypothesis 3a – High levels of business process compatibility with vertical standards increase
organizational benefits.
• Hypothesis 3b – High levels of data portability through the use of vertical standards increase
organizational benefits.

3.4

Orphaning Risk

Orphaning risk is the potential of adopting a technically-inferior technology or one that does not
become the dominant standard (Besen 1992), and may result in large legacy and switching costs
(Shapiro & Varian 1999a, b) for the firm. When orphaning risk in an industry is sufficiently high,
potential adopters wait for clearer market signals before making an adoption decision (Besen &
Johnson 1986), reducing vertical standard adoption rates. Competing standards are a threat to adoption
convergence in an industry, which increases orphaning risks for organizations forced to adopt several
standards due to business partner pressures (Mendoza & Jahng 2003, Nickerson & Muehlen 2003).
Conversely, we suggest that industry convergence towards one or few standards reduces overall
industry orphaning risk. The availability of standards-compliant complementary products and services
has been shown to be critical to standards success (Schilling 1999) and is a signal of convergence on
one or few standards. Increases in the pool of available products and services should lead to a
corresponding decrease in orphaning risk in an industry. Besen (1995) identified collaborative and
noncollaborative vendor strategies during a standard’s development and early adoption stages as
important to its success. Collaborative strategies serve overall industry needs, while noncollaborative
strategies disrupt adoption convergence for an individual firm’s benefit. We suggest that collaborative
vendor strategies lead to a reduction of orphaning risks in an industry. In light of the above discussion,
we propose that
• Hypothesis 4 – High levels of orphaning risk are associated with a lower likelihood of adoption of
vertical standards by potential adopters.
• Hypothesis 4a – Industry adoption convergence reduces orphaning risk for potential adopters.
• Hypothesis 4b – Availability of complementary products and services reduces orphaning risk for
potential adopters.

• Hypothesis 4c – Collaborative vendor strategies during standard development reduce orphaning
risk for potential adopters.

3.5

Standard Legitimation

Legitimation is a social process that establishes use patterns for a technical innovation as a preferred
solution for an industry (Emerson 1962, Lyytinen & Damsgaard 2001), and it has been suggested as
important to technology adoption (Swanson & Ramiller 1997). It is argued here that a complex set of
industry adoption signals drives the legitimacy of vertical standards, which in turn propels their
adoption. Empirical evidence points to the increased likelihood of technology adoption by
organizations participating in the activities of intermediating institutions (Teo et al. 2003) such as
SDOs, and of “herd” effects in the adoption of complex networked technologies (Damsgaard and
Lyytinen 1998). Together, these ideas suggest that participation of a firm’s business partners in
development activities for a vertical standard increase the legitimacy of the standard as a choice for
adoption for the firm. Competition amongst several potential vertical standards has been identified as a
barrier to adoption (Libicki et al. 2000, Chen et al. 2003). Since network effects can delay technology
adoption until a “winner” emerges (Angeles et al. 2001) but also accelerate it once it starts (Farrell &
Saloner 2001), we suggest that a decreasing number of SDOs in an industry signals that a single
standard will emerge as the eventual “winner,” increasing its legitimacy as an adoption choice, and
stimulating adoption by industry members. Owing to the nature of network effects, growing industry
adoption will increase the legitimacy of a vertical standard for other industry members, inducing
further adoption. Lastly, it has been shown that business partners with significant business potential
for an organization have the ability to prompt, sometimes compel, technology adoption (Bouchard
1993, Mendoza & Jahng 2003). However, in the absence of mandated adoption, business partner
adoption convergence will increase the legitimacy of a vertical standard as an adoption choice for any
firm. In light of the preceding discussion, we offer the following hypotheses
• Hypothesis 5 – Higher levels of standard legitimation are associated with a higher likelihood of
adoption of a vertical standard by organizations.
• Hypothesis 5a – Participation in the development of industry vertical standards by an
organization’s business partners increases standard legitimation for an organization.
• Hypothesis 5b – Convergence of vertical standard development activities increases standard
legitimation for an organization.
• Hypothesis 5c – Industry adoption convergence increases vertical standard legitimation for an
organization.
• Hypothesis 5d – Business partner adoption convergence increases vertical standard legitimation
for an organization.

4

CONCLUSION

Vertical standards adoption requires the use of multiple theoretical lenses, research methodologies,
and consideration to variables external to the technology and the adopter (Lyytinen & Damsgaard
2001, Dedrick & West 2003, Nickerson & Muehlen 2003). The blending of classical DoI variables
with EoS theory allows integrative research that combines organizational and community adoption
variables to explain their adoption. Individually, the constructs described in this paper are not new, but
their combined application to the study of vertical standards adoption is a new approach. The model
presented in this paper will be tested empirically in order to determine the extent to which the factors
presented contribute and shape vertical standards adoption.
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